He underscores the book’s central themes: the dangers of concentrated executive power, the erosion of democratic institutions, the fragility of constitutionalism, and the urgent need for a dynamic, evolving constitution rooted in human dignity, equality, and the rule of law. Pieris echoes Wickremeratne’s argument that constitutional supremacy—not parliamentary supremacy—is essential to safeguard democracy from majoritarian excesses. He revisits key moments such as the 17th, 19th, and 21st Amendments, judicial interventions like the 2018 dissolution cases, and global examples of democratic backsliding to illustrate how democracies often weaken quietly, without dramatic coups or tanks on the streets.
The summary message is clear: constitutional reform is not a one‑time event but a continuous, generational commitment. Democracies survive only when institutions remain independent, vigilant, and empowered—and when no office, however popular, is allowed to stand above the law. Pieris concludes by commending Dr. Wickremeratne for his enduring contribution to Sri Lanka’s constitutional discourse and urging continued engagement in this vital national conversation.
Full Speech... The video is provided below...
Dr. Jayanthi Wickremeratne, His Lordship the Chief Justice, Honorable Attorney General, Honorable Judges of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeal, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. I am honored to be invited to speak at the launch of Dr. Wickremeratne's Constitutional Conversations. Dr. Wickremeratne, who has had a ringside view of the trajectory of Sri Lanka's Constitution for over three decades, writes not as someone who has merely studied Constitutional events from a distance, but as one who has lived through them, experiencing at first hand the successes, hopes, fears, disappointments, and the unfulfilled promises of the Constitution-making process.
Reading through the chapters of this book, one cannot help but regret the lost opportunities for meaningful reform and how over the years history has repeated itself in the process of Constitutional making and of the tragic failures to learn from the lessons of history. Dr. Wickremeratne became part of the reform process 32 years ago, in 1994, and to this day successive governments have failed in the efforts to replace the 1978 Constitution. Political opportunism, vacillation, the lack of political will, and the failure at consensus building have doomed each of these efforts.
Dr. Wickremeratne takes us through events which stalled every effort towards a Constitution that would truly uphold the ideals of democracy and constitutionalism. We are also reminded that three-fourths of the amendments to the Constitution were passed within the first decade of the birth of the Constitution, when five-sixths of the Parliament was with one political party. As Dr.Wickremeratne shows in taking the reader through the travails of the Constitutional process, both the process of Constitutional amendments and the effort to have a new Constitution, the failure of politicians to act as statesmen, to think of the broader interests of the nation rather than their own narrow parochial interests have meant the failure of genuine Constitutional reform.
Constitutional conversations leaves us with the question as to how long more the people of Sri Lanka would have to wait for a Constitution with the founding Constitutional principles and values that Dr. Wickremeratne sets out in this book, where he quotes from the collective for democracy and the rule of law on the eve of the 2024 presidential elections, including among other things, human dignity, ethnic, gender and social equality, the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law, and non-concentration of state power in one individual law institution. Key among Dr. Wickremeratne's proposals is his insistence that any new Constitution must be marked by a dynamic interpretation of Constitutional provisions to advance justice and equality, a focus on social justice and participatory democracy and a Constitution that evolves rather than remains frozen in time. Much of Constitutional conversation centers around the theme of Constitutional reform, its key issues, fundamental rights and the judiciary and devolution, themes which have long been dear to Dr. Wickremeratne and which he continues to champion.
Ever present throughout the Constitutional conversations is the need to protect democracy and Constitutionalism and the sobering lesson of Sri Lanka's own experience of elected governments. Dr. Wickremeratne's experiences and his honest assessment of the development of Sri Lanka's Constitution remind us that democracy, Constitutionalism and the institutions which hold them together can at no time be taken for granted and that protecting them is part of a lived struggle. Democracy needs to be defended sometimes from the very leaders who are elected at an election.
An election, however free and fair, may not guarantee the democracy or stop them if they overreach. The temptation will always be to believe that this time concentrated power will be used wisely, that leaders can be trusted with fewer checks because their cause is just and their intentions pure. Every democracy that has slid backward believed exactly that, right up until it could no longer reverse course.
Sri Lanka's experience is that governments that win with large majorities are still governments that can be wrong, that can be tempted by their massive majorities, that can mistake a mandate for a blank check. The history of Sri Lanka has shown that democracy and institutions have faced their biggest challenges at the hands of governments with large parliamentary majorities. The majoritarian constitution of 1972 which did away with judicial review, the 1978 constitution which created the powerful executive presidency, the 18th amendment to the constitution which rolled back the positives of the 17th, the 20th amendment to the constitution which pushed back the reforms of the 19th amendment are few examples of how large parliamentary majorities have resulted in democratic backsliding.
In contrast, the relatively pro-democracy 17th, 19th and 21st amendments were all products of a parliament where governments did not command super majorities and constitutional amendments were the products of consensus. This brings us to the importance of constitutionalism. The idea that power, even power that arrives through the ballot box must be limited by the principles of constitutionalism.
The entire purpose of constitutionalism is to protect us from that very temptation including from ourselves and from even leaders we may like and admire. Dr. Vikramadapna frames this with a phrase worth remembering. Constitutional supremacy means the constitution stands above temporary political majorities, above the temporary will of whoever happens to hold office this year.
One of the most useful ideas the book offers is the distinction between the two competing visions of where ultimate authority lies in a state. In the British tradition, parliament is sovereign. In some aspects Sri Lanka follows this in preventing post enactment judicial review.
Even where the law infringes constitutional provisions and even where parliament itself has not followed its own proper internal processes. Whilst it may be argued that this model has its virtues in that it trusts the wisdom of elected representatives, it has a fatal weakness. If parliament is supreme, then a parliament captured by a determined majority can rewrite the rules of the game itself, extend its own term, as we saw in 1972, dismantle the courts that might check it, remove the safeguards that protect minorities, and there is within that legal logic no wrong being done, it is all perfectly legal.
Constitutional supremacy answers this by placing something above parliament, a constitution that even the majority cannot usually amend. Interpreted by courts empowered to strike down actions, legislative and executive that violate it. Dr. Vikram Ratnam argues, and I think correctly, that constitutional supremacy serves democracy better than parliamentary supremacy, precisely because it protects democracy from its own majorities.
It is not anti-democratic to limit majority rule. It is what makes majority rule safe to have in the first place. The book devotes a great deal of attention to a theme that will be familiar to anyone watching politics anywhere in the world today, the concentration of power in the executive and other institutions of the state allowing themselves to be subsumed by an all-powerful executive.
In the United States, we see how the Supreme Court has expanded the boundaries of the executive presidency, almost holding the president to be above the law. In the case relating to the immunity of President Trump from criminal action, the dissenting judgment of Justice Sonia Sotomayor accused the majority of the court of, I quote, making a mockery of the principle, foundational to our constitution and system of government, that no man is above the law, close quotes. Dr. Vikram Ratnam treats the concentration of power in an executive presidency as having fundamentally disturbed the constitutional balance, weakening Parliament, undermining accountability and diminishing the sovereignty that is supposed to reside in the people.
He does not treat this as one design flaw among many that can be patched. He argues that piecemeal adjustment is not enough, that meaningful democratic consolidation requires structural change, collegial decision-making, collective responsibility and power genuinely shared rather than concentrated in one office. Hence the need to abolish the executive presidency.
Dr. Vikram Ratnam's chapter on executive power, chapters on executive power, on the appointment and removal of the Prime Minister and on strengthening Parliament all speak to the dangers of democratic backsliding. He warns that Sri Lanka's democracy cannot be held hostage to the whims of successive presidents who have concentrated power, weakened institutions and undermined accountability. Stephen Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt in their seminal work, How Democracies Die, remind us that blatant dictatorships, fascism, communism and military rule has largely disappeared from the world and that most countries now hold regular elections.
Yet democracies still die, only by different, quieter means. I quote, There are no tanks in the streets. Constitutions and other nominally democratic institutions remain in place.
People still vote. Elected autocrats maintain a veneer of democracy while eviscerating its substance. Because there is no single movement, no coup, declaration of martial law or suspension of the constitution in which the regime obviously crosses the line into dictatorship, nothing may set off society's alarm bells.
Those who denounce government abuse may be dismissed as exaggerating or crying wolf. Democracy's erosion is, for many, almost imperceptible. Close quotes.
Democratic backsliding rarely announces itself with tanks in the streets. It usually begins quietly. Institutions persuaded to defer to the executive just this once.
Institutions whose independence is trimmed, an amendment or a law that is allowed to be passed to address the crisis at hand, each step is small. Each step is defensible in isolation. But when one looks at the big picture, indefensible.
And each step makes the next step on the road to autocracy easier. The book takes us through the rise and fall of the Sri Lanka's 19th amendment, a reform that clawed back power for parliament and strengthened checks on the executive, only to be largely repealed by the 20th amendment. The author makes a striking point that the lasting importance of that amendment lies not in how long it survived, but in the democratic ideals it expressed.
However, the fate of the 19th amendment also warns us that progressive reform can never be taken for granted, and that popular will is fickle and can change in a moment. Hence the need to strengthen the institutions from backsliding, independent of those who may man them for the time being. A constitution that limits power on paper is meaningless if there is no institution independent enough to enforce that limit.
Dr. Vikramaditya draws a comparison. Many of us will recognize the American case of Marbury versus Madison, in which the United States Supreme Court and the Chief Justice Marshall first asserted the power of judicial review. The authority of courts to strike down laws that conflict with the constitution.
That single doctrinal move over two centuries ago is the ancestor of every modern court that today tells an elected government, you may not, this you may not do. In the history of the second republican constitution, the decisions of the Supreme Court, in the Kalavani determination, where the government attempted to thwart the outcome of an election petition and to seat an unseated member of parliament. And the decisions of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal in the dissolution cases of 2018 are notable examples of Sri Lankan courts, of how Sri Lankan courts demonstrated their will to ensure constitutionalism.
An independent judiciary is not a technicality. It is a mechanism by which the constitutional supremacy becomes real rather than aspirational. Human rights that exist on paper, unenforceable and undefended are not rights but are mere wishes.
The book insists that fundamental rights must be real and enforceable, not merely aspirational. And this depends entirely on a judiciary with the courage and independence to act as a check even against a popular government. But the judiciary cannot do this alone.
A resilient democracy needs a network of institutions reinforcing one another. A parliament with genuine oversight power rather than a rubber stamp. Independent commissions insulated from the executive of the day.
A public service and a police that answer to law rather than to political patronage. A free and independent media, be it state or private media, that can expose overreach before it hardens into precedent. A strong and independent legal profession and a vibrant civil society.
When any one of these institutions is captured or hollowed out, the others are weakened too. Backsliding happens when one of these pieces is allowed to erode. When an institution is quietly weakened.
When the legislature stops asking hard questions. When emergency powers become permanent. When constitutional supremacy is treated as an inconvenience rather than a safeguard.
When media, whether they be state or private, become mouthpieces of any government, failing in their role to be sentinels over government. There is one more dimension of the book I want to highlight. The author argues that in a plural society, one with a real ethnic, religious or regional diversity, devolution of power is not a political concession granted grudgingly from the center, but rather a constitutional necessity.
A state that centralizes all authority in one office, unchecked by courts or a genuine legislature, is also a state more prone to governing for the majority community at the expense of minorities. Democracy gives us the right to choose who governs. Constitutionalism is what stops the chosen from ruling without limit.
Institutions, courts, legislatures, election bodies, free media, independent legal profession, civil society, are the instruments through which that limit is actually enforced day to day, case to case. And devolution in divided societies is how constitutionalism extends its protection beyond the individual to the community. The book's central lesson to my mind is this.
Constitutional reform is never a one-time achievement to be filed away. It is a continuing conversation, as the title of the book itself suggests, that each generation must be willing to have again honestly and sometimes at real political cost. Dr. Vikram Rather reminds us that a constitution is a living commitment we renew in our courts, in our legislatures, in the vigilance of a free media, and in the everyday insistence that no office, however popular, stands above the law.
That is how democracies survive its own successors and its own crises alike. That is the conversation Dr. Wickremeratne invites us to keep having. Dr. Wickremeratne, may I congratulate you for this book, and it is my wish that you will continue to contribute for many more years to the development of Sri Lanka's constitutional discourse in our nation.